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THE DEVELOPMENT OF MUSLIM 
NATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Danuta GIBAS-KRZAK*
The main goal of this article is to show the conditions and circumstances of 
the formation of Muslim nation in communist Yugoslavia and the increase of 
its significance during and after the civil war 1992-1995. Furthermore, author 
presents the characteristics of contemporary nationalism, and distinguishes 
specific Balkan nationalism, which is often chauvinistic, ahistorical, militant 
and exclusive, of ethnocultural character. The identity of Bosnian Muslims 
originated from belief that their origin, language and culture related to Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, which makes them different from the Turks and other 
Islamic nations living in the Ottoman Empire. The genesis of forming Muslim 
nation in Yugoslavia is interpreted in various ways by the researchers. There 
is a hypothesis that it has been developed thanks to activity of young peo-
ple who convinced Josip Broz Tito that such decision would reduce tensions 
between the Serbs and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to the 
Author, Muslim inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina can’t be a separate 
nation, above all, since the followers of Islam were nationally indifferent, and 
their cultural legacy is completely different than Serbian and Croatian legacy.
Keywords: Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Balkans, nationalism, nation, 
ethnic conflicts, Muslims.
Introduction
Nationalism should be understood as a political view, according to which 
natural communities living within one political system, should be independ-
ent of the others and have the same rights as the countries having similar 
position in global order. Therefore, nationalism is a trend that opposes inter-
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national movements and focuses on localness in almost the same way as in the 
period of tribal communities1. The definitions of nationalism fluctuate around 
claims that racial, cultural, historical ties are usually connected with nation-
ality, although they suit ethnicity more. Such definitions of nationalism are 
often deliberately used by the politicians and governments who use nationalist 
ideologies for their particularistic goals. The doctrine of nationalism can’t be 
clearly defined, but in the 19th century, theories dividing nationalism into 
Western and Eastern has become widespread. Western nationalism has uni-
fication features and is connected with the ideas of liberalism, whereas, East-
ern nationalism aims at creation of new cultures competing with the existing 
ones.2 Eastern nationalism is defined as “fanatical”. The society infected by it 
is stuck in complicated systems of territorial, ancestral, religious connections. 
It has also tendency to similarities between the state and culture, which is the 
essence of this nationalism.3 In the 20th century, the term nationalism has 
gained its current meaning. It includes thematic scope related to the process of 
forming or developing nations, national sentiment or being aware of belonging 
to a nation; language and symbolism of nation; social and political movement; 
doctrine or ideology of nation4. The ideology of nationalism is defined in var-
ious ways, most of the definitions are similar, therefore, we can distinguish 
its common features. The main question is overriding interest in the nation; 
therefore, nationalism is the idea that places nation in the centre of interest. 
Nationalism understood in this way is an ideological movement that wants to 
gain and maintain autonomy, unity and identity of society, of which members 
are regarded as a real or potential nation5. Modern nationalism has two signif-
icant features: timelessness and universality that are connected with historical 
rooting and huge dynamics because it is constantly more or less transformed, 
depending on external and internal factors. The danger lies in that that Eu-
ropean nationalism has usually negative connotations. It is associated with 
the growth of tensions and ethnic conflicts directly threatening the peace in 
Europe6. These conflicts are additionally strengthened by religious differences. 
In many cases, nationalism is equated with chauvinism and means unques-
tioning manifestation of sense of superiority in all fields of life towards other 
1 David Robertson, Słownik polityki (Warsaw, 2009) [Originally published in English under the 
title The Routledge Dictionary of Politics], pp. 250-251.
2 Sebastian Wojciechowski, Nacjonalizm w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej [Nationalism in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe] (Wrocław, 1999), p. 30.
3 Ibidem.
4 Anthony D. Smith, Nacjonalizm (Warsaw, 2007) [Originally published in English under the title 
Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History], pp.16-17.
5 Ibidem, p. 21.
6 S. Wojciechowski, Nacjonalizm w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej, pp.30-31.
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nations, a belief in exclusive rightness of the own nation, when other nations 
are treated with contempt or hatred. 
In the classic Encyclopedists’ perspective, nation is a group of people liv-
ing in a given territory, having the same law and government. Modern un-
derstanding of the notion of nation generally derives from two Jean Jacques 
Rousseau’s interpretations who treated nation as a “political community” and 
from Johann Gotfried Herder who emphasized the importance of “cultural 
community”, which has led to creation of definition of cultural nation.7 More-
over, two concepts of nation have become widespread: territorial and ethnic. 
The basis for definition of the first type of nation is a sense of community, 
being an effect of interactions occurring in the specific territory, in clearly 
defined geographical borders. In this case, nation should be understood as a 
political community–inevitably limited and sovereign. It should be empha-
sized that ethnical understanding of transition from nation to the state occurs 
above all in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.8 Within this approach, we can 
say about transforming ethnic ties and sentiments into national ones during 
the processes of mobilization, territorialisation and politicization. This theory 
puts emphasis on such elements as: genealogy, folk populism, customs, dia-
lects and nativeness. Moreover, ties of origin and myths related to it acquire 
significance. In such understanding of the nation, civil codes and institutions 
that hold territorial nations together are replaced with customs and dialects.
The identity of Balkan nationalisms 
In the Balkans, the phenomenon of the so-called ethnic borderland oc-
curs, where national consciousness is only being crystallized. Balkan nation-
alism is often chauvinistic, ahistorical, militant and exclusive, of ethnocultural 
character. The nations in this part of Europe are treated as cultural nations, 
whereas, religious factor is an important factor of internal mobilization. It 
results from complicated history of this region because, during Turkish occu-
pation, the inhabitants were supported mainly by the churches. Until the 19th 
century, religious institutions were the only defenders of ethnic and cultural 
identity. 9 During the Balkan wars (1912-1913), the name Balkans has become 
7 Friedrich Meinecke, Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat: Studien zur Genesis des deutschen Na-
tionalstaates [World Bourgeoisie and Nation State: Studies on the Genesis of the German Nation State] 
(Munich-Berlin, 1928), pp. 3-5.
8 Anthony D. Smith, Etniczne źródła narodów [Originally published in English under the title 
The Ethnic Origins of Nations] (Kraków, 2009), p. 200. 
9 Urs Altermatt, Sarajewo przestrzega: Etnonacjonalizm w Europie  (Kraków 1998) [Originally 
published in German under the title Das Fanal von Sarajevo: Ethnonationalismus in Europa (The 
Warning of Sarajevo: Ethnonationalism in Europe], p. 159.
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widespread in a political sense and stigmatizing term “Balkan powder keg” has 
emerged, which means clash of conflicting interests, as well as confusion and 
chaos. It is also a metaphorical reflection of various ethnic conflicts, cultural 
and religious disputes, dangerous turmoil and entering into dangerous polit-
ical, ideological and ethnic reactions10. For better explanation of specificity of 
the region, other negative terms connected with the Balkans have been de-
veloped, for example, “Balkan powder keg”, which defines brittle character of 
events, imposing the thinking of this region as a place of unpredictable events, 
whose inhabitants are unpredictable. The term “Balkanization” that has be-
come widespread since the Berlin Congress means nationalist fragmentation, 
which is also a synonym of tense relations between small neighbouring coun-
tries leading to never-ending conflicts.11 Nationalisms in the Balkans is par-
ticularly dangerous due to the fact specific type of Eastern nationalism, also 
called “hot” has developed there. It is characterized both as “venomous” and 
“fanatical”. It refers to complicated territorial, ancestral, cultural and religious 
relations, and its goal is to create new cultures that compete with the ones that 
already existed. Destructive character of such nationalism manifests usually 
in spectacular actions taken in order to defend national interest that leads 
to reactivation of already existing antagonism.12 In the eyes of people in the 
West, the Balkans are perceived as a region dominated by irrational nation-
alism, which due to the lack of higher cultures, appeals to folk output.13 The 
nationalists representing this concept refer to customary and language ties. In 
modern ethnic conflicts in the Balkans, the opponents want to dominate, sub-
due and destroy and even annihilate the other side. Such nationalism may lead 
to revival of atavistic cult of own blood and own territory.14 Therefore, these 
conflicts are determined and permanent in their goals. It seems that, from 
historical perspective, they will never end. Nationalism in the 21st century has 
become one of the major problems affecting international security because 
after the end of the cold war, the division into powerful and satisfied, powerful 
and dissatisfied, weak and satisfied, weak and dissatisfied countries and na-
tions has returned. The last group, having potentially the most short-tempered 
10 Tomasz Wituch, “Bałkany – szkic definicji” [“Balkans - definition sketch”], Dzieje Najnowsze 
XXX (1998), No. 2: 139.
11 Magdalena Koch, “’My’ i ‘Oni’, ‘Swój’, i ‘Obcy’: Bałkany XX wieku z perspektywy kolonial-
nej” [“’We’ and ‘They’, ‘His’, and ‘Alien’: Balkans of the 20th Century from a Colonial Perspective’], 
Porównania 6 (2009),  No. 6: 79.
12 S. Wojciechowski, Nacjonalizm w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej, p. 41.
13 Krzysztof Jaskułowski, Nacjonalizm bez narodów: Nacjonalizm w koncepcjach anglosaskich 
nauk społecznych [Nationalism Without Nations: Nationalism in the Concepts of Anglo-Saxon Social 
Sciences] (Wrocław, 2009), p. 206.
14 Adam Koseski, “Bałkańskie konflikty etniczne w latach dziewięćdziesiątych XX wieku” [“‘Bal-
kan ethnic conflicts in the 1990s”], Rocznik Nauk Politycznych (2000), No. 1 (2): 82.
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character occurs mainly in post-Soviet area, in East-Central Europe, Balkan 
Peninsula and Middle East.15
Muslim nation in the Balkans 
At the stage of forming a nation, there were two opposing tendencies in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina: integrative and diversifying. The first one refers 
to nation as a state community, and the second one to cultural community 
with significant religious factor, which was interpreted as ethnic and assumed 
building the nations around faith.16 Whereas, religion in the culture of this 
community was treated as superior to language, literature, art and customs. 
The dispute over Bosnia and Herzegovina was a part of general rivalry for the 
position of a leader between South Slavs, in which two ideas were competing: 
Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia. In Bosnian historiography, there is a con-
stant discussion on thousand-year-old tradition and continuity of history of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, including also the possibility of forming a nation. It 
is often defined as a continuation from the medieval ruler, Ban Kulin, through 
Bogomils, accepting Islam to modern times.17 The nationality of the followers 
of Islam, understood as clearly defined regional identity entity, which included 
both medieval kingdom and separate wilayah in the Ottoman Empire, was 
becoming an important element in ethnic landscape of this area. Serbian and 
Croatian historiographic reception stands in opposition to it because Bosnia 
and Herzegovina is not treated as a separate entity, but as a central part of na-
tional space of the Serbs or Croats. It seems that discussion on this subject has 
come to a standstill because research in Bosnia and Herzegovina concerning 
the genesis of nation are in deep crisis. There isn’t neither developed model, 
nor methodology.18 Although Muslim inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
who should be treated as Turkish Slavs, played more and more important role 
on this territory, it was communist Yugoslavia that helped to shape special 
type of Muslim nation, now called Bosniak. 
Muslim population was appreciated by the Communist Party during the 
first meeting of Ant-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugosla-
via in November 1942, when Josip Broz-Tito emphasized that Yugoslavia is 
15 T. Wituch, “Bałkany – szkic definicji”: 139.
16 Danuta Gibas-Krzak, Bośnia i Hercegowina: determinanty dziejów: Pomiędzy Serbami, Chor-
watami a supremacją Muzułmanów [Bosnia and Herzegovina: Determinants of History: Between 
Serbs, Croats and Muslim Supremacy] (Częstochowa, 2016), p. 150.
17 Husnija Kamberović, Historiografja u Bosni i Hercegovini u službi politike [Historiography in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Service of Politics] (Zagreb, 2012), pp.140-141.
18 Ibidem, p.142.
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inhabited by the nations having equal rights: Serbs, Croatians, Slovenians, 
Montenegrins, Macedonians and Muslims.19 In the next years, Muslim popu-
lation actively participated in creation of ethnic policy, being in the opposition 
to Croatian and Serbian concept. According to many Bosniak authors, their 
stand expressed negation of Greater Croatian annexation of Bosnia and Herze-
govina within Independent State of Croatia, as well as the plan of Greater Ser-
bian inclusion of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was supposed to be the part 
of homogeneous Greater Serbia.20 At the end of 1950s a campaign promoting 
Yugoslavian nationality had weakened, mainly because society feared central-
ization of power and Serbian control. The party’s policy on national issue was 
dominated by more liberal approach, which resulted in formal recognition of 
the Muslims in ethic sense. In November 1959, Josip Broz-Tito, during the 2nd 
Plenum of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia 
emphasized the freedom of choice for every inhabitant.21 Census from 1961 did 
not grant the followers of Islam national rights, but introduced the category of 
“Muslim in ethnic sense”. Such status was chosen by 972 954 people, including 
842 954 inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina22. When Aleksander Rank-
ović, vice-president of Yugoslavia and the head of security service regarded 
as the enemy of Kosovar Albanians who was also sceptical about granting 
Muslim population the status of nation, had left political scene, new gener-
ation of politicians seized power in Bosnia and Herzegovina and t initiated 
dynamic debate on Muslim nation.23 In 1967 Muhamed Filipović published 
and essay on Bosnian spirit in literature (Bosanski duh u književnosti - šta je to? 
[Bosnian Spirit in Literature - What is It?]), which was regarded by some com-
munists as a manifesto of anti-government activity and example of Muslim 
nationalism. In the same year, a team of experts from the faculty of political 
sciences in Sarajevo was appointed. This team was led by Hamdija Čemerlić 
who worked on the project called The position of the Muslims in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina on national identification (Stav muslimana Bosne i Hercegovine 
u pogledu nacionalnog opredjeljenja). The researchers collected arguments for 
19 In this case, small letter is used because followers of Islam were not treated then as a nation.
20 Robert J. Donia, John V. A. Fine, Jr., Bosna i Hercegovina: iznevjerena tradicija (Sarajevo, 2011) 
[Originally published in English under the title Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed], p. 
160.
21 Izet Šabotić, “Nacionalno pitanje Bošnjaka – Muslimana u projekcijama Komunističke Partije/
Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije” [“The National Question of Bosniaks - Muslims in the Projections of 
the Communist Party / League of Communists of Yugoslavia”], in: Identitet Bosne i Hercegovine kroz 
historiju: Zbornik Radova, Husnija Kamberović (ed.), volume 2 (Sarajevo, 2011), p. 141.
22 Ibidem, p. 142.
23 Dženita Sarač–Rujanac, Odnos vjerskog i nacionalnog u identitetu Bošnjaka od 1980. do 1990. 
godine [The Relation of Religious and National in the Identity of Bosniaks from 1980 to 1990] (Saraje-
vo, 2012), p. 43.
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Muslim nationality in a way that could be approved by party leaders, whereas, 
one of the authors of the project, Atif Purivatra, proposed a thesis of ethnic 
and national uniqueness of the followers of Islam.24 The identity of Bosnian 
Muslims originated from belief that their origin, language and culture were 
connected with Bosnia and Herzegovina, which makes them different from 
the Turks and other Islamic nations living in the empire under the rule of 
Padishahs. A hypothesis about gradual building of unique Muslim community 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the rule of the Ottomans has been devel-
oped.25 Two sessions of the Central Committee of the League of Communists 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in January and May 1968 were decisive for recog-
nition of Muslim nation in Yugoslavia. The issue of increasing economic and 
political importance of the Republic was raised again and the status of the 
so-called Bošnjak was discussed, concluding that Muslim nation exists, and it 
is a unique cultural and historical community. As a result of many propagan-
da actions, the League of Communists admitted that the Muslims should be 
treated as a separate nation, whereas, during census in 1971, the inhabitants of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina would identify as Muslims – in national sense. 1 482 
400 inhabitants (39,6%) identified themselves as Muslims, 1 393 100 people, 
that is, 37,2%, identified as the Serbs and Croatian nationality was chosen by 
772 500, that is, 20,6%, whereas, status of Yugoslavian nation was chosen only 
by 43 800 inhabitants, that is, 1,2%26.
The genesis of forming Muslim nation in Yugoslavia is interpreted in var-
ious ways by the researchers. There is a hypothesis that it has been developed 
thanks to activity of young people who convinced Josip Broz-Tito that such 
decision would reduce tensions between the Serbs and Croatians in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, whereas, Bosnia and Herzegovina was supposed to be a tampon 
zone, dividing areas with the strongest separatisms and nationalisms.27 There 
were also dilemmas that were revealed in subsequent years, not only in scien-
tific discourse, but above all journalistic. The Muslims were treated in Serbian 
media as a nationality, whereas, Sarajevo publications were saying that the 
Muslims is a nation in a historical sense, just like Croatians or Serbs, and it 
24 Enver Redžić, Sto godina muslimanske politike: U tezama i kontraverzama istorijske nauke: Gen-
eza ideje bosanske, bošnjačke nacije [One Hundred Years of Muslim Politics: In The Theses and Contro-
versies of Historical Science: The Genesis of the Idea of  the Bosnian, Bosniak Nation] (Sarajevo, 2000), 
pp. 79-80.
25 H. Kamberović, Historiografja u Bosni i Hercegovini u službi politike, p. 25.
26 Piotr Eberhardt, Przemiany demograficzno-etniczne na obszarze Jugosławii w XX wieku [Demo-
graphic and Ethnic Changes in Yugoslavia in the 20th Century] (Lublin, 2005), p. 77. 
27 Miša Gleni [Misha Glenny], Pad Jugoslavije: Treći balkanski rat (Belgrade, 2002) [Originally 
published in English under the title The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War], pp.149-150.
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would be a mistake to claim that it was an “artificial creation”.28 Nevertheless, 
discussion on this subject is being continued to this day, also in neighbouring 
countries, Croatia and Serbia, having often political character and stimulating 
“ethnic upheaval” in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The development of Muslim nationalism  
In the 1970s and 1980s, many successful attempts were made to strengthen 
Muslim-Bosniak nation on the forum of federation. In 1971, Pašaga Mandžić 
and the so-called Tuzla Group were accused of “developing Muslim national-
ism and chauvinism”. They were sentenced for criticizing decisions of partisan 
command during the World War II, which in their opinion, led to excessive 
losses in Muslim population in eastern Bosnia.29 In 1974, during discussion on 
ethnic development of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Branislav Đurđev said that 
the process of forming Muslim nation did not consist only of Islamization, 
but also gradual social identity under conditions of the Ottoman power. In 
the 1970s, Yugoslav authorities warned that the goal of Islamic fundamen-
talists is Islamization of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The authorities strived to 
separate religious from national elements, in order to prevent “secular” Islam 
from being a threat, and above all competition for Yugoslavian nationality. 
They were afraid that Yugoslavia would become the next stage of Islamization 
of Europe and bridge to propagate Muslim fundamentalism in Western Eu-
rope30. In 1983, thirteen members of the organization called “Young Muslims”, 
among others, Alija Izetbegović, Husein Živalj, Hasan Čengić, Omer Behmen 
and Džemaludin Latić were accused of: pan-Islamism, anti-communism, ter-
rorism, connections with the world of Islam and Iranian revolution, as well as 
calling to ethnically pure Bosnia and Herzegovina. The importance of “Islamic 
Declaration” was emphasized during the process. This declaration was signed 
thirteen years earlier by Izetbegovic and it was regarded as an ideological pro-
gram of Muslim nationalism, because one of its goals was establishment of 
Muslim order in Bosnia and Herzegovina, even with the use of force.31 The 
judges found them guilty and sentenced to between 6 months and 15 years 
28 I. Šabotić, “Nacionalno pitanje Bošnjaka – Muslimana u projekcijama Komunističke Partije/
Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije”, pp. 147-148.
29 Šaćir Filandra, Bošnjačka politika u XX. stoljeću [Bosniak Politics in the 20th Century] (Sarajevo, 
1998), pp. 248-250.
30 Darko Trifunović, Islamic Terrorism and Al Qaeda in the Balkans: Testimony of Former Al Qae-
da Lieutenant (Alexandria, 2014), p. 29.
31 Ljubomir Borovčanin, Bosanske ratne simulacije: Uzroci, karakteristike i posljedice rata u Bosni 
i Hercegovini 1992-1995 [Bosnian War Simulations: Causes, Characteristics and Consequences of the 
War in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992-1995] (Belgrade, 2001), p. 42.
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of prison. In the justification of the sentence, it was said that the accused be-
longed to a group of nationalists supporting ethnically pure Bosnia that was 
supposed to be a republic organized in accordance with the Sharia law and 
a part of large Islamic state, stretching from Afghanistan to South-East Eu-
rope.32 At the end of the 1980s, the convicts were released early from prison 
and then they became political dissidents in the society undergoing transfor-
mation towards pluralism. In this way, using their good situation, they were 
able to gain power, build foundations of new Bosnian state that has been es-
tablished after the civil war. 
In 1990, another debate on Muslim identity took place, which was inspired 
by the publication of Alija Isaković’s a study which consisted of articles about 
the process of building Muslim nation between the end of the 19th century 
and the close of the 20th century. In 1991, other well-known intellectuals: Atif 
Purivara, Mustafa Imamović and Rusmir Mahmutćejahić supported Muslim 
nationality, and rejected of idea Bosniak nationality.33 The legitimization of 
Muslim nation met with strong opposition, especially in Serbia, where writ-
er Dobrica Ćosić and historian Jovan Marjanović claimed that communist 
leaders artificially construct nations and such experiment would have nega-
tive consequences. The communists from Macedonia have not supported the 
granting national status to the Muslims, because they were afraid that Mus-
lim minority in their republic would demand emancipation and then separate 
from recently recognized (in 1945) Macedonian nation. 
The creation of Muslim nation has not only become the factor antagoniz-
ing nationalities and ethnic groups, but also decreased the number of peo-
ple who identified themselves as Yugoslavians in comparison with previous 
census. The legitimization of the followers of Islam in some sense ruined the 
chances to implement the idea of Yugoslavian nation, which was supposed to 
unite the inhabitants. However, the Muslims have never been a straight ma-
jority in Bosnia and Herzegovina, although its population, above all, due to 
high birth rate, has considerably increased, whereas, population of the Serbs 
has decreased by 4,8% and Croatians by 2,4%34. It should be added that Islam 
professed by the inhabitants of the Republic was not radical. The majority of 
Muslims were Sunnis, although Sufism played a significant role as a theolog-
ical and intellectual trend, often called Muslim mysticism. Faith was of su-
perficial character and visits at the mosques were limited mainly to rare visits 
32 D. Trifunović, Islamic Terrorism and Al Qaeda in the Balkans, p.26.
33 Rusmir Mahmutćehajić, “Bošnjaci i/ili/ Muslimani”[“Bosniaks and/or/ Muslims”], in: Atif Pu-
rivatra, Mustafa Imamović, Rusmir Mahmutćehajić, Muslimani i bošnjaštvo (Sarajevo, 1991), pp. 
77-78.
34 P. Eberhardt, Przemiany demograficzno-etniczne na obszarze Jugosławii w XX wieku, pp. 77-78.
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connected with the most significant events such as: birth, marriage or funeral. 
10% of the Bosnians identified themselves as atheists or agnostics.35 Another 
element of the revival of life of this community was development of mystical 
currents of Islam, among others, Dervish Movement. Many articles published 
in the “Preporod”, in which importance of religion as a nation-building factor 
was emphasized, indicating also the necessity of close connection of religious 
with national identity, made people afraid of development of Muslim funda-
mentalism.36 In the 1980s, madrasa teachers were tried for distributing illegal 
literature propagating militant Islam and Muslim nationalism. Muslims soon 
demanded more rights. There were more and more demands that concerned 
not only increasing the number of new sacred and prayer places, but also im-
proving the functioning of Islamic institutions. Young people were particu-
larly active. The travels to Islamic countries made them inspired for another 
demands, including demands of political character.37 The members of Muslim 
National Committee for Bosnia and Herzegovina demanded disbandment of 
security service SDB (Služba državne bezbjednosti) and the creation of a new 
constitution, in which Muslims were supposed to be the only constitutive 
nation, whereas, other nations would only have cultural autonomy.38 Demo-
graphic development of the followers of Islam increased their population in 
1991 to 1 905 800, making them majority due to the fact that Muslims consti-
tuted 43,7% inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina.39  Similar scenario was 
conducted to those in Kosovo, where Muslims had dominated and driven out 
Christian population, gaining numerical superiority over them, which resulted 
in demands of secession and then sovereignty. Bosnian nationalism reached 
its apogee during the civil war that has resulted in the demise of communist 
Yugoslavia, when the change of ethnonym from “Muslim” to “Bosniak” (Bošn-
jak) in September 1993 during Bosniak Congress in Sarajevo strengthened the 
position of Muslim nation. The delegates of Muslim minority from Serbia and 
Montenegro participated in this congress.40
35 Fuad Saltaga, Muslimanska nacija u Jugoslaviji [Muslim Nation in Yugoslavia] (Sarajevo, 1991), 
pp. 218-219.
36 Omer Behmen, Na dnu dna [At the Bottom] (Sarajevo, 2006), pp. 214-215.
37 Džon R. Šindler [John R. Schindler], Nesveti terror: Bosna, Al Kaida i uspon globalnog dżihada 
(Belgrade, 2009) [Originally published in English under the title Unholy Terror: Bosnia, Al-Qa’ida, 
and the Rise of Global Jihad], pp.41-42.
38 D. Gibas-Krzak, Bośnia i Hercegowina: determinanty dziejów: Pomiędzy Serbami, Chorwatami a 
supremacją Muzułmanów, p.160.
39 P. Eberhardt, Przemiany demograficzno-etniczne na obszarze Jugosławii w XX wieku, p. 79.
40 Krzysztof M. Zalewski, Naród, religia, rasa. Muzułmańskie ideologie i ruchy narodowe pogran-
icza w Południowo-Wschodniej Europie: Przykład Sandżaka nowopazarskiego w XX wieku [Nation, 
Religion, Race: Muslim Ideologies and National Movements of the Borderland in Southeastern Europe: 
An example of the Sanjak of Novi Pazar in the 20th Century] (Warsaw, 2010), p.195.
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Through decisions made in Dayton in 1995, international community 
wanted to enable nations living in Bosnia and Herzegovina to create multina-
tional and multicultural state and legal and administrative foundations. How-
ever, unstable country has been established that comprises of two parts called 
entities: Serbian Republic (Republika Srpska in Serbian) and Croatian-Muslim 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Every entity has its own constitution, 
government, police and armed forces. Since the constitution clearly states that 
there are three constitutional nations, at the central centre, there is collegi-
al 3-person presidency – Presidium of Bosnia and Herzegovina comprising 
of the members of three ethnic communities: Muslims, Croatians and Serbs. 
However, constitutional order developed by American lawyers has caused that 
political system of this state has dysfunctional features, which makes ruling 
it and building civil society more difficult. Every territorial unit has separate 
executive and legislative authority, which generates large, expensive civil ser-
vice. Such institutional order allows politicians to blame one another for the 
problems and use ethnic questions to stay in power. The way both chambers 
of parliament are functioning is determined by ethnic divisions because vital 
interests of every of three constitutional nations must be preserved. Part of 
the problems related to the functioning of political system result from the 
fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina is in fact an international protectorate.41 An 
important aspect of ethnic changes that have occurred after the civil war is 
strengthening national identity of Muslims, who now identify themselves as 
Bosniaks. The change of ethnonym was supposed to be an essential element 
in the process of abreacting of this community after the civil war. Before the 
war, many followers of Islam did not think that they belong to Muslim nation 
because religious questions were everyone’s personal choice, whereas, after 
the war, being a Muslim (Bosniak) in sense national has become a faith, even 
for atheists. Such actions were aimed at recovering from traumatic wartime 
experiences because opinion-forming environments in Western Europe and 
United States think it was the followers of Islam who were the main victims of 
the civil war.42 However, such argumentation is false because not only Muslims 
suffered physical and psychical losses, and explanation that the nation has 
formed while healing post-traumatic trauma is not convincing. It gives rise to 
other divisions in the society, in which Bosniaks (Muslims) have become de-
41 Krzysztof Krysieniel, W cieniu Dayton: Bośnia i Hercegowina między etnokracją i demokracją 
konsocjonalną [In the Shadow of Dayton: Bosnia and Herzegovina between Ethnocracy and Consoca-
tional Democracy] (Warsaw, 2012), p. 263.
42 Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the new Nationalism (Toronto, 1993), p. 
33.
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mographically dominant entity.43 This fact is without scruple used for promo-
tion of Islam and development of fundamentalist sects, including Wahhabis 
who are financially supported by Saudi Arabia. 
Conclusions
Ethnic policy of the president Josip-Broz Tito, which aimed at combating 
nationalisms, did not bring expected results, which can be seen in the divi-
sions in small Yugoslavia, as Bosnia and Herzegovina was described due to 
its ethnic specificity. Muslim elites feared homogenization of culture, which 
manifested in aspirations to create Yugoslavian nationality, criticizing com-
bating Albanian separatist movements by the communists. The conservative 
wing in the environment of the party leaders of the Republic, regarded as the 
most loyal to Tito, supported actions aimed at polarizing splitting tenden-
cies, including Muslim nationalism, although consequences of decisions made 
at that time were far-reaching and rather negative when it comes to ethnic 
policy. They have developed a new model of nation (quasi-nation) that has 
started dominating in Bosnia and Herzegovina, becoming a significant factor 
of fragmentation of society. Creating Muslim nationality has also triggered 
megalomania among the followers of Islam who started attributing features 
of a constitutive nation to themselves. In the case of the members of Muslim 
community, the identity of ethnic and religious character played the key role. 
It was indicated that it was a result of historical continuation, from the Middle 
Ages to modern times. However, taking theories about nation into account, 
it is practically impossible to create a model of Bosnian nation (Bosniak). Na-
tion should be characterized by common language, territory, cultural legacy, 
participation in national culture, common resource of thoughts and emotions, 
existence of separate consciousness, sense of being a nation and having com-
mon state in the past. Above all, nation is a community convinced of identi-
cal consciousness and emotional ties.44 It seems that Muslim inhabitants of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina who speak South Slavic language that is now called 
Bosnian,45 in accordance with this model, can’t be a separate nation, above all, 
43 Bosnia and Herzegovina has 3,849,891 inhabitants, 50,1% of Bosniaks, 30,8% of Serbs and 
15,4% of Croats (other nationalities 2,7%), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/bk.html, accessed on June 20, 2019.
44 Marek Waldenberg, Kwestie narodowe w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej: Dzieje, Idee [National 
Issues in Central and Eastern Europe: History, Ideas] (Warsaw, 1992), pp. 16-18.
45 Prior to the 1990s official name of the language in Bosnia and Hercegovina was called srps-
kohrvatski ili hrvatskosrpski (Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian). During the period from 1945 to 
1990 Catholic Church as the religious organization which was followed by the vast majority of Bos-
nian-Hercegovinian Croats continued to call in its publications their language Croatian.
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due to the fact that the followers of Islam were nationally indifferent and their 
cultural legacy is completely different than Serbian and Croatian legacy.
Since about 2005, “transformation crisis” has begun in Bosnia and Herze-
govina because politicians of three constitutional nations don’t want to build 
multicultural society, but strengthen feuds between nations that, although 
frozen, may lead to explosion in Bosnian powder keg.46 The dysfunctionality 
of political system of this state is closely connected with complicated ethnic 
situation, because political system was dominated by the rule of priority of 
ethnic group over individual. Bosnia and Herzegovina at the turn of 20th and 
21st century has become a model example of sad specificity of borderland with 
conflicted multi-ethnic community. Whereas, “Bosnian borderland” accepting 
mutual cultural differences among inhabitants has sunk into oblivion.47 The 
paradigm of the so-called cultural borderland is currently becoming more 
influential – understood as national and civilizational borderland, where Mus-
lim national community and the so-called Bosniak identity have been formed 
in opposition to Croatians and Serbs. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that three 
constitutional nations will build consolidated society because only interna-
tional supervision in Bosnia and Herzegovina may keep “fragile peace”. 
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